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Foreword
Statements of Tax Policy represent a conscientious effort by the
federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate, de
velop positions on, matters of tax policy covering major areas of
taxation in which members of the accounting profession have
special competence.
Reform of the present system of estate and gift taxation has
been under serious consideration for a number of years, with
proposals for change coming from many sources, including Con
gress, the Treasury Department, and a number of professional
organizations. The federal tax division has also been actively ad
vocating changes in this area, and its ideas and proposals are
summarized in this statement. It is intended that the formal
presentation of this study will assist members of the congressional
tax writing committees, members of the executive branch of gov
ernment, and the public in their consideration of this subject.
Statements of Tax Policy are approved by the executive com
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the
division’s tax policy subcommittee. Other division subcommittees
may develop a policy statement if requested to do so. This state
ment was developed by the 1972-73 financial and estate plan
ning subcommittee and approved by the 1973-74 executive com
mittee.

Executive Committee
1973-74
Robert G. Skinner, CPA,
Chairm an
Joseph E. DeCaminada, CPA
Richard M. Hammer, CPA
Charles R. Lees, CPA
William C. Penick, CPA
Robert C. Plumb, CPA

John Raber, CPA
William L. Raby, CPA
Jerome A. Seidman, CPA
Jerome P. Solari, CPA
Roy Soll, CPA
Don J. Summa, CPA

Financial and Estate Planning Subcommittee
1972-73
Joseph E. DeCaminada, CPA
Chairm an
John R. Gentry, CPA
Martin Helpern, CPA
Joel M. Forster, D irector
F ed eral Tax Division

Arthur S. Hoffman, CPA
Kurt D. Steiner, CPA
Ralph Steinman, CPA
Richard Stone, CPA
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Synopsis of A ICPA Position
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sup
ports estate and gift tax reform legislation in the following key
areas.

Generation-Skipping Transfers
Under current law, an individual can make a transfer of prop
erty to a descendant two generations removed and, so long as
intervening generations are limited to a mere economic interest
(that is, an income interest), no estate or gift tax is imposed on
the intervening generation. We recommend the following:
• No imposition of tax on outright transfers benefitting a
“skipped” generation.
• Imposition of a tax on creation of inter vivos and testamen
tary trusts which benefit a skipped generation.
• Basing such tax on actuarially determined values.
• Imposing such tax on the estate of the skipped generation
and making it payable from trust corpus.
• A liberal disclaimer provision and extension of the previous
ly taxed property tax credit for a period of up to twenty-five
years.

The Marital Deduction
Under present law a decedent may transfer up to one half of
his estate to his spouse free of tax so long as the interest trans
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ferred does not lapse because of the passage of time or occur
rence of certain events ( “terminable interest rule”). We recom
mend the following:
• Retention of the 50 percent marital deduction limitation.
• Retention of the terminable interest rule.
• As stated below, an exemption level of $150,000, which
would permit a $300,000 estate to pass free of tax.

Appreciated Assets Transferred at Death
At present, when a decedent owning appreciated assets dies,
the appreciation is not subject to the income tax, and the benefi
ciaries take a basis in the property received equal to its fair
market value. We recommend retention of our present system in
this area.

Unified Transfer Tax
There currently exists an exemption from the estate tax of
$60,000, and a lifetime gift tax exemption of $30,000 per donor.
In addition, there is an annual exclusion of $3,000 for each donee
for gifts of present interests. We recommend the following:
• Unification of these two systems of transfer taxes.
• Retention of the present estate and gift tax rates.
• That upon death, there be included in the estate tax compu
tation 75 percent of the fair market value of inter vivos gifts
made.
• Allowance of a credit for gift taxes paid on inter vivos gifts.
• Retention of the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion.
• Increasing to $150,000 the current combined $90,000 exemp
tion for estate and gift taxes.

Liberalization of Deferred Payment of Federal Estate Tax
Under present law, an extension of time to pay the federal
estate tax may be granted in two situations: (1 ) where payment
of the tax would result in “undue hardship” to the estate (Sec
tion 6161) and (2 ) where the estate consists largely of an inter
est in a closely held business ( Section 6166). In addition, Section

2

303 permits certain redemption distributions to be made to help
in paying the estate tax, without certain adverse income tax
consequences. We recommend the following:
• Treatment as a single corporation, for both Sections 303 and
6166 purposes, a decedent’s interest in two or more corpora
tions if the estate owns more than 50 percent of each,
• No change in the amount of redemption proceeds qualifying
under Section 303.
• Liberalization of ownership requirements in connection with
the payment of estate taxes where an estate consists largely
of an interest in a closely held business.
• Liberalization of Section 6161 with regard to extensions of
time for payment of the tax.
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Generation-Skipping Transfers
Background
Under current law, a person may transfer property by gift or
bequest to a lineal descendent more than one generation re
moved from himself (for example, a grandchild), and, as a re
sult, the transfer tax is not paid by the intervening generation. In
addition to outright transfers, a settlor may make a taxable trans
fer of property and not have the property subject to transfer tax
again for several generations with the use of trust instruments
which satisfy the rule against perpetuities. This is true although
some elements of beneficial enjoyment of the property accrue to
the intervening ( or “skipped” ) generations.

Discussion
The U.S. Treasury Department Tax R eform Studies an d Pro
posals dated February 5, 1969,1 pertaining to estate tax, recom
mended a tax upon generation-skipping transfers. It was pro
posed to levy a “substitute” tax, in addition to the present trans
fer taxes, if property is transferred to a grandchild or more re-

1 U.S. Treasury Department, “Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,” A Trea
sury Tax Study (Washington, D.C., Feb. 5, 1969), hereinafter referred to
as 1969 Treasury Proposals. All subsequent direct citations of this report
will be indicated by page number within the body of the text.
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mote generation. This tax upon generation-skipping (G ST ) would
apply to outright transfers as well as transfers in trust. The tax
would be 60 percent of the basic transfer tax, unless the member
of the skipped generation elected to treat the transfer as a gift
or bequest to him and a simultaneous gift to the next generation.
Position of Other Professional Groups

On April 30, 1968, the American Law Institute (A L I) issued
a report entitled F ed eral Estate and G ift Tax Project.2 It was
therein reported that the Council to the Members of the ALI
approved a resolution to recommend a GST only upon a very
limited class of transfers. Basically, the ALI proposal was to have
a GST only upon transfers in trust that would vest in a younger
generation at a time subsequent to the time of death of the im
mediately succeeding generation. In other words, if the trust
provided for income for benefit of a child and the remainder to a
grandchild upon the death of the child, there would be no ad
ditional tax. If, however, the trust continued after the death of
the child with the remainder to a great-grandchild upon the
grandchild’s death, there would be an additional tax.
The American Bankers Association (ABA) would also limit
the GST solely to transfers in trust. The ABA, in general, would
impose a GST only if the transfer skips more than one genera
tion.

AICPA Proposals
The AICPA’s position is that there should be a tax upon trans
fers in trust that skip a generation; the Institute favors a limited
inclusion in the estate of the member of the skipped generation,
provided such person had a beneficial interest in the trust. The
AICPA, therefore, makes the following proposals.
No Separate G eneration-Skipping Tax on Testator or Settlor.
To the extent that there would be a tax on the property passing
to a grandchild or later generation, such tax would be computed

2 Published as Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: Recommendations Adopted
by the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 23-4, 1968.

6

by including a value in the gross estate of the skipped person.
The tax would be due at the time that person's estate tax is due.
Thus, no additional tax would be due from the settlor of an inter
vivos gift in trust nor from the estate of the creator of a testa
mentary trust. The tax would be payable from the corpus of the
trust. If a generation obtains its interest in the trust or the prop
erty in a manner other than by death of the skipped generation
(such as after a certain term ), the tax would be payable at the
time of transfer of interest as though the generation whose in
terest had terminated had made a gift.
N o A dditional Tax on Outright G ifts or Bequests. Only gifts
in trust would be included in the gross estate of the skipped per
son. Also, only to the extent that the skipped person had a bene
ficial interest would there be an inclusion.
Inclusion in Gross Estate B ased Upon Actuarial Values. If a
person’s beneficial interest in a trust expires and if a more remote
generation from the grantor than such person will obtain an in
terest (for example, if the son of a grantor dies and the corpus
goes to the grantor’s grandchild), then a computation would be
made of an amount to be included in the estate ( or taxable gifts)
of such a person. The fair market value of the corpus at the date
of such termination would be calculated. A pro rata portion of
this fair market value would be included in the calculation of
his gift tax. The portion included would be based upon an ac
tuarial computation of the interest so terminated. This computa
tion would be made as of the date the trust is created ( or at the
date it became irrevocable if this is later). If the decedent was
solely an income beneficiary, the actuarial value would be based
upon present value tables of a life-income interest using the age
of the beneficiary as of the date of the commencement of his in
come interest in the trust. If his interest was only for a term of
years, then the calculation would be based upon that period. The
AICPA believes, however, that the present 6 percent table is too
high for this purpose. A table based upon a 4.5 percent or 5 per
cent return would appear to be more equitable.
E xam ple—Assume that a father dies at a time when his son is
age forty-five. Father leaves $1 million in trust with income to his
son, and upon the son’s death, the remainder to his grandchil
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dren. When the son dies, the corpus has a fair market value of
$2 million. The present value at 5 percent of the right to use
$1 for the life of a forty-five-year-old person is about 62 per
cent. Thus, 62 percent of the $2 million date-of-death value
would be subject to estate tax upon the death of the life benefi
ciary. The amount subject to tax would be limited to the interest
passing to the next generation. The estate tax would be paid out
of the trust corpus unless the life beneficiary provided by will or
otherwise that the tax should come from his estate.
The tax charged to the corpus would be from the top brackets.
Thus, the personal estate of the life beneficiary would not be af
fected by the inclusion of the life interest in the tax computation.
W ith Sprinkling Trust, Taxation o f Corpus Upon D eath o f Last
Beneficiary to Die. The question arises as to the best method of
taxing the corpus when the income may be paid to any member
of a class that includes more than one member of the skipped
generation through the use of a sprinkling trust. The AICPA
recognizes that arguments could be made for taxing a portion of
the corpus as each beneficiary dies or when the last member dies,
basing the tax in either case upon the rates applicable as if the
pro rata part had been included in each beneficiary’s estate at the
time he died. Yet again, arguments could be made for granting
various elections to the trustee. Each of these various approaches
has certain advantages. They all, however, lack the characteris
tics of simplicity and ease of administration. Because it would
work without putting an unreasonable burden upon the IRS or
the trustees, the AICPA has determined that the best approach
would be to tax the corpus upon the death of the last beneficiary
to die, based upon the facts applicable to such last member of
the generation. Thus, if the last to die had an actuarial interest of
60 percent, that percentage of the fair market value of the corpus
on the date of his death would be included and taxed in his
estate.
In this regard, it is important to note the need for the enact
ment of a very liberal disclaimer provision. The AICPA recom
mends that the Internal Revenue Code provide that a beneficiary
may be permitted to waive his income rights at any time within
a two-year period commencing with the date of death of the
testator or with the date that an inter vivos trust is created. Such
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a disclaimer would result in no tax. There would be tax neither
at the date of disclaimer nor at the date of the beneficiary’s
subsequent death. Thus, the possibility is reduced that the corpus
would be taxed at rates applicable to the wealthiest members of
the generation.
W ith Pow er to In vade the Corpus, Taxation o f Corpus B ased
on V alue at Tim e o f Beneficiary’s D eath. The trustee may have
the power to invade the corpus for the benefit of a member of the
skipped generation, or the beneficiary may have the power to de
mand the corpus. If the beneficiary does not disclaim his right to
receive the corpus pursuant to such power, the AICPA would
have the tax on the corpus based upon values at the time of his
death. There would not be any reduction based upon actuarial
computations unless the invasion power is less than complete.
Thus, assuming that a person has a limited power to request cor
pus ( for example, a right to $5,000 or 5 percent of the corpus per
year), the value of such right would be included in his estate tax
computation. If, therefore, a forty-five-year-old person received a
life interest and a “5-and-5” power, the AICPA would actuarially
compute the value of the power plus the value of an income in
terest upon the remaining corpus. The tax on this amount would
be based upon fair market values at the time of his death. If he
actually draws down corpus each year, the AICPA would not
have the remaining corpus subjected to a tax based upon this
power. If the power is partially used, the computed amount
would be reduced by the amount previously withdrawn.
Even in a case where there is more than one member of the
generation for whom there can be an invasion, the AICPA would
not recommend a tax until the last member dies. At such time,
the full fair market value would be included and taxed in such
last person’s estate. In other words, the facts and circumstances
applicable to the last surviving member would be used for the
tax computation. An obvious exception would be those cases
where a portion of the trust’s corpus terminates as each skipped
person dies. In such a case, there would be a tax on such a por
tion at the time of termination.
M ore L ibera l Credits fo r Tax Paid on Prior Transfers. An in
justice can occur if the skipped person dies shortly after the trust
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is created. The severity of this problem can be greatly reduced,
however, by the AICPA proposal for more liberal credits for tax
paid on prior transfers. For this purpose, a liberal credit would
be allowed not only for estate tax on prior transfers, but also for
gift tax paid in the case of an inter vivos trust. (This logically
follows as a result of the proposed integration of the gift and
estate taxes.)
W ith Tw o S kip p ed Generations, Taxation B ased Upon Actu
arial Com putations. There would be a tax upon the death of
each skipped generation based upon actuarial computations. The
actuarial interest of a child who had an income interest would
be taxed upon his death. The actuarial interest of a member of
the next, skipped, generation would be taxed upon that member’s
death. Assuming, for example, a life income to a son and then to
a grandson with remainder to great grandchildren, the tax upon
the death of the son would be as described above. The tax upon
death of the grandchild would be based upon his age at the time
his income interest vested (that is, at the death of the son). If
the grandchild should predecease the son, there would be no
tax upon the grandchild’s death. If the grandchild dies shortly
after the son, there would be a liberal credit for the tax paid
upon the son’s death.
Extension o f Availability o f Previously T axed Property Credit.
Under present law, if a gross estate includes property recently
inherited from a prior decedent and the prior decedent’s estate
paid a tax with respect to the property, a credit is available to
the second estate. A full credit is available if less than two years
has elapsed between the two deaths. The credit is reduced by
20 percent every two years, until no credit is available if the
second death occurs more than ten years after the first.
Estate and gift tax reforms have been proposed that will gen
erate additional tax revenue. The generation-skipping proposals,
in particular, can result in a tax for each generation rather than
for every second or third generation, as is presently the case with
large accumulations of wealth. Because of the greater and more
frequent incidence of tax, the AICPA has concluded that the pre
viously taxed property credit should be available for a longer
period of time than the present ten years.
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The AICPA favors extending the availability of the previously
taxed property credit. For the first five years after death a 100
percent credit for prior estate taxes would be granted. The per
centage of the credit available would be reduced by 5 percent
per year thereafter. When a period of twenty-five years has
elapsed, no credit would be available.
E xam ple—Assume that A dies in 1974 leaving his entire estate
to B, and B dies in 1978. B’s estate will have an available credit
equal to the entire estate tax paid by the estate of A.
If B dies in 1984, ten years after A dies, the credit would be
reduced to 75 percent of the taxes paid by A’s estate, that is, 100
percent less 25 percent (five years at 5 percent). If B dies after
1999, no credit from A’s estate would be available.
The period of twenty-five years was selected as representative
of a customary period between generations. The gradual reduc
tion in credit between five and twenty-five years was considered
to be logical inasmuch as the second decedent would have en
joyed the inherited assets for some period of time. The transfer
at his death should, therefore, be at least partially taxed.
This liberalization becomes logical if generation skipping is
adopted. If a member of a skipped generation dies prior to his
actuarial expectancy, his estate, under the AICPA proposals,
must nevertheless include an actuarially computed amount. The
liberalized credit results in fairer treatment in such cases of pre
mature death.

Summary
The AICPA is opposed to a tax upon outright generation-skip
ping transfers because the member of the skipped generation has
no economic interest in the property. Further, the AICPA finds
nothing socially or economically wrong with gifts or bequests that
totally skip a generation. If a person has an economic interest,
that interest should be subject to a tax at the time the interest
terminates. The tax should be measured by the value of the per
son’s estate as well as the value of the interest. An additional tax
on the original settlor or on his estate is unfavorable, since this
would cause an incorrect timing of the tax. Nor should taxpayers
be required to make an election as to when the tax is payable or
as to when the trust property should be valued. The AICPA is
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opposed to the IRS proposals because it does not believe that a
new tax should be enacted. Rather, it is thought that the situa
tion can be corrected by redefining the criteria that will result in
inclusions in a gross estate or in taxable gifts. The IRS proposals
may result in excessive complexity, lack of relationship of the
tax to the economic interest subject to tax, and incorrect timing
of the tax.
There are many situations not covered in this presentation.
Only a basic concept necessary to solve a basic problem has been
set forth. This basic problem is that, at present, a generation may
have the benefit of corpus which is not subject to transfer tax
when it is passed on to the next generation. To subject such
corpus fully to tax when the generation has only a limited interest
is, in the opinion of the AICPA, inappropriate. The foregoing
proposals attempt to find a fair and equitable solution to a very
real problem.
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The Marital Deduction
Background
Current law allows a deduction to a donor or decedent for part
of the value of property transferred to a spouse. Such a deduc
tion, referred to as the “marital deduction,” is limited in the case
of a gift to one-half of the value of the gift and in the case of
an estate to one-half of the “adjusted gross estate.” As a result of
the marital deduction, an individual may transfer one-half of his
separate property to his spouse, tax free.
To qualify for the marital deduction, outright ownership of the
property transferred generally must pass to the spouse so that, un
less it is consumed or again given away, it will eventually be in
cluded in the estate of the surviving spouse. Such provision is re
ferred to as the “terminable interest rule.”

Discussion
Many practitioners and professional groups believe that the
present structure of the marital deduction works a hardship on
small to moderate-sized estates, especially those estates where all
the assets are bequeathed to a widow who must provide for her
self and her children. Treasury Department studies indicate that,
on the average, a widow survives her husband by ten years, and
it is felt that when property passes to a widow, a tax imposes a
difficult burden at a time when other significant income sources
often disappear.
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w hile it is generally agreed that adequate protection for
widows and a reduction in estate tax on moderate estates is a
necessary part of estate tax reform, there does not appear to be
any reason for the deferral of estate taxes when property trans
ferred to a surviving spouse is more than sufficient to satisfy her
needs. An unlimited marital deduction, advocated by some
groups, goes far beyond the objective of providing relief to a sur
viving spouse and would be of greater benefit to larger estates
than smaller estates.
Studies indicate that the adoption of an unlimited marital
deduction would result in a permanent reduction of 7 percent of
the revenue from federal estate and gift taxes and an immediate
revenue loss of as high as 17 percent since there would be a tax
deferral until such time as the surviving spouse dies. Most of the
other estate and gift tax reform proposals would result in an in
crease in revenue. Accordingly, a retention of the existing 50 per
cent marital deduction (with a modification for modest estates)
would allow for an adjustment in the rate structure and exemp
tion level which would not be dependent on the enactment of a
provision for taxing appreciation at death.
An unlimited marital deduction would tend to distort proper
estate planning. In order to minimize the tax on the first to die,
there would be a tendency to transfer all of the property to the
surviving spouse. In estates of any substance, the transfer of all
property to a surviving spouse, particularly when there are chil
dren, should not be encouraged. Under an unlimited marital de
duction, deferral possibilities resulting from remarriages can be
carried to ludicrous extremes.
Adoption of an unlimited marital deduction appears to make
the adoption of a beneficial enjoyment theory essential. Under an
unlimited marital deduction, the beneficial enjoyment test would
be the only means available for a decedent to have control over
the ultimate disposition of property and yet for such property to
qualify for the marital deduction. Such a provision would be a
necessity where there are children involved or in situations of
second marriages where the tax deferral opportunity under an
unlimited marital deduction would encourage outright transfers
of all property to surviving spouses.
While the adoption of a beneficial enjoyment rule would allow
a decedent to qualify property for the marital deduction and still
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retain control over its ultimate disposition, it would appear that
an unlimited marital deduction would still tend to encourage the
transfer of all property to a surviving spouse.
Position of Other Professional Groups

In their studies for estate and gift tax reform, the U.S. Trea
sury Department, the American Law Institute, and the American
Bankers Association all propose liberalization of the current mar
ital deduction with respect to both the amount of the deduction
and the type of interest which will qualify.
Recommendations of the Treasury and of the ALI propose that
the present 50 percent marital deduction be removed entirely
and replaced by an unlimited 100 percent marital deduction. The
ABA favors a retention of the existing 50 percent marital deduc
tion, coupled with a deduction for the first $250,000 of property
transferred to the surviving spouse regardless of the 50 percent
limitation.
With respect to the type of interest which will qualify for the
marital deduction, the Treasury, the ALI, and the ABA, in gen
eral agree that the present terminable interest rule should be
eliminated and replaced by a concept referred to as the “current
beneficial enjoyment rule,” whereby a mere income interest to
the surviving spouse may qualify for the marital deduction. Un
der the current beneficial enjoyment rule, an interest will qualify
for the marital deduction whether or not the surviving spouse
controls the underlying property, as long as it is agreed that the
property will be taxed at the death of the spouse.

AICPA Proposals
R etention o f the 50 Percent M arital D eduction. The AICPA
believes that the current incidence of gift and estate taxation im
poses a disproportionate burden on small and medium-sized
estates. The AICPA’s unified transfer tax proposal recommends
an exemption level of $150,000. Assuming an exemption level of
$150,000, it is felt that a 50 percent marital deduction will pro
vide adequate relief for a surviving spouse in moderate-sized
estates. Accordingly, the AICPA recommends a retention of the
50 percent marital deduction as currently provided in IRC Sec.
2056.
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R etention o f th e Existing T erm inable Interest Rules. The
AICPA also recommends a retention of the existing terminable
interest rules. Advocates of change in the existing terminable in
terest rule point to the complex and technical requirements neces
sary for an interest other than outright ownership to qualify for
the marital deduction. The existing terminable interest rule has
resulted in an inequity for those unaware of its restrictive pro
visions. To replace such rule with a beneficial enjoyment theory
would likewise cause inequity to the unwary. While a beneficial
enjoyment rule would allow for greater flexibility in estate plan
ning, introduction into the Internal Revenue Code of an entirely
new concept permitting a mere income interest to qualify for the
marital deduction would add additional complexity to the law
probably causing considerable new litigation.

Summary
The AICPA is opposed to a change in the federal estate and
gift tax laws that would permit an unlimited marital deduction
and the addition of a beneficial enjoyment rule. While estate tax
reform should provide adequate protection to a surviving spouse
in moderate estates, the AICPA feels that the increase in the ex
isting exemption level to $150,000 from $60,000, along with re
tention of the existing marital deduction and terminable interest
rules, will accomplish such a result. A change to an unlimited
marital deduction and a beneficial enjoyment concept would be
of greater benefit to larger estates, resulting in substantial rev
enue loss and adding further complexity to the existing tax laws.
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4
Appreciated Assets
Transferred at Death
Background
Under current law, the federal estate tax is imposed upon the
fair market value of assets includable in the decedent’s gross
estate determined at the date of death or alternate valuation date
(after taking into account allowable deductions and credits). The
basis of the property in the hands of the recipient beneficiaries
then generally becomes its value for estate tax purposes. If, how
ever, the property represents the right to “income in respect of a
decedent”—such as wages receivable after death, or obligations
derived from a sale reported by the decedent under the install
ment method—the beneficiary must carry over the decedent’s
basis, if any.
Asset appreciation is not subject to income tax, although it is
included in the post-death basis of the asset, under the general
rule stated above. Appreciated property transferred by inter
vivos gift normally retains the same basis in the hands of the
donee as it had in the hands of the donor, plus gift tax paid on
the full value of the transfer.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals contended that the current law
permits vast portions of capital gains to escape income taxation.
It charged that the law fails to recognize the separate characters
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of estate and income taxation. It further claimed that accumula
tions derived from appreciation are favored over accumulations
from annually assessed dividends, interest, and wages. In addi
tion, the Treasury Department also stated that “unnatural hold
ing patterns” develop because older investors become locked into
appreciated assets to avoid paying income taxes on recognized
gains. The Treasury Department drew up statistical tables based
upon data gleaned from returns of the 1960’s and concluded that
$15 billion a year of capital gains fall outside the income tax sys
tem.
Under the 1969 Treasury Proposals’ capital gain tax concept,
the appreciation on capital assets held at death would be taxed
in the final income tax return of the decedent as if the assets had
been held for more than six months and sold just prior to death.
“Income in respect of a decedent” would no longer be taxed as
the income is received. It too would be “bunched” into the de
cedent’s final return and taxed as capital gain or ordinary income,
depending upon its nature. Only appreciation that accumulates
after enactment of the proposals would be subject to the tax.
Thus, the provisions would not have retroactive effect, but estab
lishing valuations on the enactment date would be necessary.
The income tax attributable to such capital gains and “income
in respect of a decedent” would be deductible from the gross
estate of the decedent and would reduce the taxable estate and,
accordingly, reduce the estate tax (if any) otherwise payable.
The taxed property would acquire a stepped-up basis in the
hands of the beneficiaries as under current law.
Property transferred to a surviving spouse and to charity would
be exempted from the tax. The decedent’s basis for the property
would carry over to the spouse. Every decedent would have a
minimum basis entitlement of $60,000 to preclude taxation below
that level. All losses on capital assets held at death would be con
sidered long-term and applied against capital gains in the year
of death; then, under special rules, applied in the following or
der: against capital gains in the three prior years; against or
dinary income for the year of death; and, lastly, against ordinary
income of the three prior years. When losses are carried back,
they would be applied first to the most recent preceding year.
Only 50 percent of the capital loss would be deductible when
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applied against ordinary income. Any losses not applied during
the four-year period would expire unused.
Under the 1969 Treasury Proposals, since appreciation on prop
erty passing to widows and charity—and to a limited extent, to
orphans—would not be taxed, the basis would be allocated arith
metically among the assets other than cash, in proportion to their
respective fair market values. The objective of this rule would be
to discourage transfers to particular beneficiaries principally to
accomplish tax objectives.
Income taxes generated by the foregoing proposals would be
payable, along with the estate tax, under broadened tax deferral
provisions. The 1969 Treasury Proposals also held out the pros
pect of lowering transfer taxes to the extent that revenues are
expected to be produced by this new capital gains tax.

Discussion
Some insight into the rationale underlying the 1969 Treasury
Proposals can be gained by reflecting upon certain statements
contained therein, and upon a lecture given by their chief ad
vocate, Professor Stanley S. Surrey. The proposals assert: “For
adm inistrative reasons the tax system does not every year make
the taxpayer [whose assets have appreciated] calculate how much
his holdings have appreciated in value.” (P. 332; emphasis and
bracketed matter supplied.) Professor Surrey elaborated upon
this theme during his portion of the Third Hess Memorial Lec
ture delivered to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York on November 18, 1971. Among other things, he stated:
We could, and probably in equity we should, tax gains as they
accrue currently year by year. But, we don’t and the income
tax system stays its hand as the asset increases in value, partly
for administrative reasons and partly for policy reasons, such as,
for example, that money may not be at hand to pay the tax.1
1 Richard B. Covey, Stanley S. Surrey, David B. Westfall, “Perspectives on
Suggested Revisions in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation,” in The Record
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Vol. 28, no. 1
(1973), p. 49. All subsequent citations of this article will be made by
page number within the body of the text.
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This argument could lead to the conclusion that if the admin
istrative procedures could be made somewhat easier, then noth
ing would stand in the way of a periodic, perhaps year-by-year,
tax on unrealized appreciation. Another factor is the philosophical
view of the economist Gardiner Ackley, which was quoted with
apparent approval by Professor Surrey during the Hess Lecture
and introduced by his comment that these words do not come
from a radical economist:
In my judgment the time has now come to move steadily and
rapidly toward the virtual abolition of the unequal start in eco
nomic life that accrues to one who is born rich. . . .
The vehicle is at hand to do this in the radical revision of our
estate and gift tax laws. I should hope that within a decade or
two we could place a virtual ceiling on the transmission of more
than the most minimal property income from members of one
generation to members of the next. (pp. 45-6)
If one starts with a predilection for the income taxation of un
realized gains and is inclined to seek the eradication of disparities
of wealth, these factors would tend to support a tax system con
taining the technical complexities and burdens inherent in the
capital gain tax proposals. While this report does not take a posi
tion with respect to such goals, the AICPA feels however, that
Congress ought to be fully aware that they may be the spring
board of the 1969 Treasury Proposals.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals place great weight on statistics
to stimulate Congress to action. It should also be noted, however,
that the Treasury Department drafted the proposals in the con
text of an active stock market and used examples of investors
who experienced 50 percent appreciation in one year. Shortly
after the proposals were issued, the stock market began a pre
cipitous plunge. More recent statistics indicate the probability
that severe inequities could result from the arbitrary taxation of
appreciation at a date prior to the realization of capital gains.
While those in favor of a tax on appreciation at death often
argue that it eliminates the lock-in problem, changing economic
conditions are a far stronger force to that end. We have recently
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witnessed significant changes in investment philosophies, and
traditional practices of indefinitely holding on to “blue chip” in
vestments are now being challenged. Untouched investments in
many basic industries—rails, automobiles, chemicals, basic metals,
electronics, and so forth—over extended periods of time would
have produced little gain and some notable financial disasters.
Tomorrow’s “blue chip” investments will be different from to
day’s, and the elemental urge to preserve capital will dictate
changes in security portfolios.
There is one type of investment, however, where a tax on ap
preciation is certain to forcibly unlock long-standing ownerships
—small businesses. The problem here is that the unlocking pro
cess may be ruinous. The prospect of the conjunction of income
and estate taxes on the value of the business would probably ac
celerate the trend to merge or sell out to avert forced sales when
the owners of closely-held companies die. This consequence
should not be overlooked by Congress when it considers the ad
visability of imposing a capital gain tax on appreciation.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals repeatedly refer to the advan
tages held by a taxpayer who accumulates wealth through un
taxed appreciation of his capital assets over one who earns or
dinary income. While there is no doubt that one who is subject
annually to a tax upon his ordinary income is at a comparative
disadvantage, that disadvantage exists whether or not the investor
is taxed on his capital gains, because the capital gain tax applies
only when the investor chooses to realize the gain, and the tax is
at lower effective rates. Probity dictates that the effects of cur
rent law be evaluated by comparing persons who are similarly
situated to measure fairly the advantages that one may have over
the other.
The two exhibits that follow contradict the implications of
the 1969 Treasury Proposals that the current law permits highbracket taxpayers to elude paying their fair share of taxes forever.
They disclose that the estate tax, assuming other proposals in this
report for a unitary tax structure and for the prevention of gen
eration skipping are enacted, effectively balances the tax impact
in the two situations.
Exhibit 1, page 22, compares two taxpayers, A-1 and B-1. At the
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beginning of a 20-year period ended by their deaths, both held $2
million worth of capital assets. During the 20 years, the assets ap
preciate 30 percent (compounded) every five years. A-1 sells his
property at five-year intervals and pays the capital gain taxes.
When he died, the last five years of appreciation remained un
taxed. B-1 does not sell any appreciated assets, so that the appre
ciation arrives unreduced by income taxes into his estate. The
Treasury Department’s commentary indicates that, under current
law, B-1 has enormous advantages over A-1, but it disregards the
effects of the estate tax in this situation. For example, the Trea
sury Department states: “The estate tax will fall on both [A-1

EXHIBIT 1

Assets
Taxpayer A-1

Taxes
Paid

(000 O m itted)
$2,000

Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$600
210

Appreciation—second 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$717
251

390

$ 210

$2,390
466

251

$2,856
Appreciation—third 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$857
300

557

300

$3,413
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%
Not taxed, taxpayer dies
Federal gross estate tax

Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount
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1,024
$4,437
2,076

2,076

$2,361

$2,837

45%

55%

EXHIBIT 1 continued

Assets

Taxes
Paid

(000 O m itted)

Taxpayer B-1
Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30%

$2,000
600

Appreciation—second 5 years—30%

$2,600
780

Appreciation—third 5 years—30%

$3,380
1,014

Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%

$4,394
1,318

Federal gross estate tax

$5,712
2,905

Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount

$2,807

$2,905

49%

51%

and B-1] so it is not relevant to say that [B-1] ought not to pay
any income tax on his accumulation of wealth ‘because he pays
an estate tax.’ ” ( P. 332; emphasis and bracketed matter added. )
In Exhibit 1, A-1, the repeatedly taxed investor would have
paid or had paid by his estate cumulative taxes of $2,837,000.
B-1, who avoided the capital gain tax would have paid federal
estate taxes aggregating $2,905,000—$68,000 more than A-1.
Exhibit 2 employs the same assumptions with respect to sales
and growth rates, except that taxpayers A-2 and B-2 each held
$4 million worth of capital assets at the beginning of a 20-year
period ending with their deaths, B-2, who deferred payment
of tax until his death and thereby obtained a stepped-up
basis free of income taxes, would have paid taxes aggregating
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$7,138,000, or $429,000 more than the cumulative taxes paid by
A-2. The taxable estates of A-1 and A-2 would have been re
duced, of course, by both the taxes paid and the appreciation on
the tax money no longer available for investment. The higher
estate tax brackets reached by B-1 and B-2 brings the percentage
of assets of the four estates paid into the federal treasury into
comparable alignment. The computations for these two exhibits
are as follows.
Exhibits 1 and 2 assume that the taxpayer is not married at
date of death and is therefore unable to utilize the marital de
duction. In the following two supplementary illustrations, the
facts are identical except that the taxpayer takes advantage.

EXHIBIT 2

Assets

Taxes
Paid

(000 O m itted)

Taxpayer A-2

$ 4,000

Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$1,200
420

Appreciation—second 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$1,434
502

Appreciation—third 5 years—30%
Tax-35%

$1,714
600

780

$ 420

$ 4,780
932

502

$ 5,712
1,114

600

$ 6,826
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%
Not taxed, taxpayer dies
Federal gross estate tax

Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount
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2,048
$ 8,874
5,187

5,187

$ 3,687

$6,709

35%

65%

EXHIBIT 2 continued

Assets
Taxpayer B-2

Taxes
Paid

(000 O m itted)

Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30%

$ 4,000
1,200

Appreciation—second 5 years—30%

$ 5,200
1,560

Appreciation—third 5 years—30%

$ 6,760
2,028

Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%

$ 8,788
2,636

Federal gross estate tax

$11,424
7,138
$ 4,286

$7,138

38%

62%

Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount

EXHIBIT 3

Taxes
Paid

Assets
Taxpayer A-1 and Spouse
At time of death
Marital

(000 O m itted)
$4,437
(2,218)

$2,218

2,219
831

2,218
830

1,661

1,388

$1,388

$2,422

Federal gross estate tax

$ 761

1,388
Assets transferred

$2,776

Assets transferred versus
taxes paid

53%

25

47%

EXHIBIT 3 continued

Taxes
Paid

Assets
Taxpayer B-1 an d Spouse
At time of death
Marital

(000 O m itted)
$5,712
(2,856)

$2,856

None

2,856
1,155

2,856
1,155

$2,310

1,701

$1,701

$2,310

Federal gross estate tax

1,701
Assets transferred

$3,402

Assets transferred versus
taxes paid

60%

40%

through transferring one-half of his property to his spouse, of the
maximum marital deduction.
In Exhibit 3, the total taxes paid by A-1 and spouse (the tax
payers who recognized gains and paid the capital gains tax) now
EXHIBIT 4

Taxes
Paid

Assets
(000 O m itted)

Taxpayer A-2 and Spouse
At time of death
Marital
Federal gross estate tax

$1,522

$ 8,874
( 4,437)

$4,437

4,437
2,076

4,437
2,076

4,152

2,361

$2,361

$5,674

2,361
Assets transferred

$ 4,722

Assets transferred versus
taxes paid

45%

26

55%

EXHIBIT 4 continued

Taxes
Paid

Assets
(000 O m itted)

Taxpayer B-2 and Spouse
At time of death
Marital

None

$11,424
( 5,712)

$5,712

5,712
2,905

5,712
2,905

$5,810

2,807

$2,807

$5,810

Federal gross estate tax

2,807
Assets transferred

$ 5,614

Assets transferred versus
taxes paid

49%

51%

exceeds by a minor amount ($2,422,000 versus $2,310,000) the
estate taxes paid by B-1 and spouse. However, in Exhibit 4, the
estate taxes paid by B-2 and spouse continue to exceed
($5,810,000 versus $5,674,000) the combination of capital gains
and estate taxes paid by A-2 and spouse.
The AICPA believes that Professor Surrey was erroneous in
these remarks concerning the present system during the Hess
Lecture:
This com plete forgiveness is totally unfair to people who have
built up their estate from after-tax income, whether it derives
from dividends, salary or capital gains upon which tax has al
ready been paid. It is a com plete windfall to those who are
building up their estates out of before-tax income, the untaxed
appreciation in value. (p . 49; emphasis added)

Certainly the terms “complete forgiveness,” “complete wind
fall,” and “untaxed appreciation” are grossly deceptive and do
not properly describe the tax situations of the hypothetical tax
payers B-1 and B-2 in the above illustrations.
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Position of Another Professional Group—
American Bankers Association

In its commentary on the 1969 Treasury Proposals, the ABA
contends that the capital gain tax on appreciation at death is re
gressive and unfair. Large estates would have the lowest net rate
of capital gain tax since the tax would be allowed as a deduction
at the highest transfer tax bracket. At present rates, 77 percent
of the capital gain tax could be recouped from the estate tax.
Whatever progressive rate scale is adopted, the capital gain tax
must bite more deeply into estates in the lower brackets.
Undue complexity is another charge levelled against the Trea
sury Proposals by the ABA. Complications stem from the exclu
sion from the capital gain tax of property qualifying for the mari
tal, charitable, and orphans deductions. Such exclusions would
make the basis of any particular asset unknown until all assets are
finally allocated among the beneficiaries, and sales of assets and
funding of bequests of pecuniary amounts would have long un
certain tax consequences.
The ABA further points out that the 1969 Treasury Proposals
contain a specter of interdependent tax computations with multi
ple variables. The amount of the marital and charitable deduc
tions depends on the capital gain tax; that tax is dependent on
the amount of property qualifying for the deductions; and the
estate tax depends on, and often is interwoven with, the equation
in fractional share deduction computations.
The brusque discarding by the 1969 Treasury Proposals of the
present deferred tax treatment of “income in respect of a dece
dent” in IRC Sec. 691 is challenged by the ABA. The Treasury
Department proposed to bunch all “income in respect of a dece
dent,” whenever it is to be received, in the final return of the de
cedent, leaving the amelioration of the tax consequences to the
income-averaging provisions. The ABA points out that the pro
posal complicates rather than simplifies the taxation of such in
come. Generally, “income in respect of a decedent” is not readily
marketable and not readily subject to accurate valuation. There
fore, it will necessarily be reported at values below the full
amounts to be collected. The discount would be reported over
the same period, in the same fashion, and by the same taxpayers
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as under current law. Moreover, anticipatory taxation would cre
ate serious liquidity problems for the estate.
The ABA further points out that taxpayers with identical
amounts of losses would be treated differently, depending upon
the existence of gains and losses in the year of death and in the
three prior years. Furthermore, while losses would be allowed on
lifetime gifts, they would be disallowed on transfers to related
parties. The ABA rhetorically asks, “To whom does one ordinar
ily make lifetime gifts, if not to related parties?”
In other areas of criticism, the ABA takes issue with the Trea
sury Department’s proposed allowance of basis at the higher of
actual basis or enactment date value, with the minimum basis,
with the absence of an exemption for life insurance, and with the
triggering of added taxes where the decedent’s state of residence
conforms its income taxes to those of the federal government. The
ABA shies away from the obligation to prove cost basis, asserting
that many taxpayers maintain inadequate records, in reliance
upon the stepped-up bases rules under the current estate tax law.
The ABA originally advocated carryover of basis as its alter
native to the present system. It reconsidered, and now is in favor
of the Additional Estate Tax (A E T ). Under the carryover of
basis concept, the transferor’s tax basis for all properties included
in the decedent’s estate would carry over to the transferee, as is
the case at present when property is transferred by inter vivos
gift. The federal estate tax before state death tax credit would be
added to the bases of assets transferred, but limited to the extent
that the fair market value of the estate’s assets exceed their bases.
Tangible property held for personal use by the decedent would
be allowed a step-up of basis within the limits of $5,000 per item
and $25,000 in total.
The carryover-of-basis proposal was attractive for the follow
ing reasons:
• It has proved to be operative under present gift tax rules;
• The tax burden would fall on the parties who realize income
on a voluntary sale of the property, and at a time when funds be
come available to pay the tax;
• Death is not the moment of realization of income;
• Carryover of basis meets the objection to the escape from in
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come tax of appreciation on a decedent’s assets;
• The inequity of imposition of tax before realization of income
cannot be eliminated by averaging devices; and
• Relief measures for deferring the tax will not be necessary un
der the carryover-of-basis concept.
Yet in its commentary on the carryover-of-basis proposal, the
ABA presented its reconsideration of the matter.
The ABA is deeply concerned with proposals that would re
quire the establishment of historical cost basis for federal income
tax purposes after property passes through an estate. It contends
in its commentary, that many people have not maintained ade
quate records in reliance on current law which makes cost basis
irrelevant when the property owner dies.
The carryover-of-basis proposal also allows the addition of fed
eral estate taxes to the bases of items of property. The ABA is
concerned that sales of property by the executor of an estate
prior to the final determination of the estate tax liability will in
volve guesswork as to the income tax consequences of such sales
and will necessitate the filing of amended fiduciary and benefi
ciary income tax returns as a matter of burdensome routine. Fur
ther, with carryover of basis the period over which taxpayers
tend to refrain from the sale of property to postpone the inci
dence of taxation would be indefinitely extended, thus creating a
lock-in problem.
The ABA also considers it manifestly unfair for estate taxes to
be allocated under the carryover-of-basis proposal to property
qualifying for the marital or charitable deductions. Yet, if certain
property is to receive a basis adjustment, and other property is
not, the entire process of administration would be beset by the
indefiniteness of the bases of specific items.
Sales soon after the date of death are often obligatory to pay
death taxes, debts, expenses, and bequests. Under the carryoverof-basis proposal, the ABA concluded, these sales may result in
substantial capital gains, and the need to pay taxes thereon may
require further sales which in turn may add to additional cap
ital gain taxes—a compound “mushroom ” effect. In light of this
interaction, the ABA contends that the carryover-of-basis proposal
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bears a close resemblance to the capital gains tax-at-death pro
posal—without the advantages of the latter (that is, the capital
gains tax liability would reduce the estate tax).
The ABA believes that a carryover-of-basis rule would bring
with it the practical elimination of the utilitarian pecuniary mar
ital bequest. Draftsmen would be wary because the funding of
such bequests might involve recognition of prohibitive amounts
of capital gain.
Finally, if a carryover-of-basis rule is enacted, the ABA envi
sions firm resistance by Congress to meaningful transfer tax re
ductions. The ABA believes that the tax revenues eventually to
be derived from adoption of a carryover-of-basis rule cannot be
accurately measured.
While the ABA favors retention of the current taxing system, it
urges only as the least problem-filled alternative the adoption of
the “Additional Estate Tax” (A E T ). The ABA devised the AET
as an alternative to the capital gains tax after deciding to reject
support for the carryover-of-basis concept which it had previous
ly favored.
The AET would be imposed at the fixed rate of 14 percent on
net appreciation of assets upon death and upon transfers made
within the two years preceding death. Property transferred earli
er would take a carryover basis as under current law. The 14 per
cent rate was arrived at by multiplying the complement of a
postulated highest transfer tax bracket (60 percent) by the high
est capital gains tax rate (35 percent). The tax would apply even
upon property qualifying for the marital and charitable deduc
tions.
Losses at death would not be rebated to any extent by the
AET. The ABA considers their proposed reduced rate structure
a sufficient compensation for estates holding depreciated assets.
Only appreciation after the enactment of the AET would be sub
ject to the tax. Accordingly, the proposed rate reductions of the
transfer tax to a ceiling of 60 percent would be phased in over a
five-year period as the revenues generated by the AET would
presumably increase.
The A ET is advocated by the ABA in lieu of the Treasury Pro
posals on three broad grounds: (1 ) it would be progressive, and
therefore fair; (2 ) it would be simple because it would avoid
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complex refinements, and would be collected along with the basic
transfer tax; and (3 ) it would be constitutional because it would
be an excise tax, a classification which might not apply to the
capital gains tax. Each of these claimed attributes of the AET is
evaluated below.

AICPA Proposals
R etention o f Current Law . After carefully studying each of
the proposals for taxing, directly or indirectly, the unrealized ap
preciation of assets at death, the AICPA concluded that the ob
jectionable features of each proposal were compelling and beyond
recasting. It has further concluded that the AICPA should not
temper its strong belief that the current law should not be
abandoned, or by expressing a qualified preference for one pro
posed change over the others. The following discussion serves to
support the AICPA’s conclusions.
The a b a ’s proposed tax is called an “Additional Estate Tax,”
but it is not that; it is an income tax. It is measured by gains—
unrealized gains—and that is its fundamental defect. The AICPA,
as a general observation, takes the position that the claimed ad
vantages of the AET are not valid. It does not agree that the tax
is fair, progressive, simple, and constitutional beyond debate.
T h e Correlation o f D eath and Gain. The focal point of the
problem with both the AET and the 1969 Treasury Proposals is
their turn from the heretofore well-established principle that
taxes on appreciation should be imposed only when gains are
realized and when cash to pay the taxes is generated. The AICPA
believes that the view of death as a moment of realization of gain
is philosophically unsound. Paper profits at any point in time
are so ephemeral that, if they are to be taxed, only an immense
ly complex system involving alternate valuation dates, liberal tax
deferrals, credits, averaging, and quick-refund procedures could
possibly provide for fairness.
D ou ble Tax. The AET would be in effect a double tax. This
is acknowledged by the ABA. No deduction would be allowed
for the basic estate tax for AET purposes. The resultant double
tax is embraced by the ABA so that the AET would be progres
sive, when viewed in combination with the basic estate tax.

32

Rate o f Tax. The AET would not be on a graduated scale,
yet it is labeled “progressive” by the ABA. It is not convincing
to contend that the AET is progressive when (but only when) it
is combined with the basic estate tax rate schedule. It is obvious
that a taxpayer who has accumulated a modest amount of tax
able appreciation over many years would be taxed at the same
rate as one who has accumulated substantial appreciation over
a short-term period. By contrast, the income tax rules do ease the
burden upon lower-bracket taxpayers. In addition, the inclusion
of only one-half of net long-term gain in taxable income, the ex
emption from the minimum tax, and the income averaging pro
visions operate in favor of the individual who recognizes relative
ly small amounts of gain on an annual basis.
The AET rate would be tied directly to the highest capital
gain tax rates. There have been many proposals to increase or
otherwise modify the capital gains tax. If the tax is increased, as
it has been in recent years, it has been assumed that an increase
in the rate of the AET would follow. Such a change would mag
nify the problems associated with the AET, not the least of which
would be the liquidity crisis in prospect for estates.
Basis Problem s. The ABA is concerned with the requirement,
especially under the carryover-of-basis proposal, to prove actual
cost basis. The AICPA does not share that concern—at least not
to an extent that would justify so complicating the estate tax
structure. The current recordkeeping requirements should be
observed by all taxpayers; and no taxpayer should be entitled to
ignore these requirements based on the highly speculative as
sumption that he will hold his property until his death.
The a b a ’s concern with proof of basis, however, does not ex
tend to several areas in which carryover of basis is adopted un
der the AET. For example, there is apparently no concern with
the present gift tax basis rules. Nevertheless, to avoid proof of
basis it proposes to adopt a start-up date rule. The AICPA sees
a serious problem in the choice of fair market value on the en
actment date as the basis of property for AET purposes.
The enactment date rule would create a nationwide appraisal
obligation which would be a substantial administrative burden.
Estates are not necessarily made up primarily of listed securities,
and the valuation problems at the time of death could be enor
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mous. Disputes between examining agents and taxpayers’ repre
sentatives often involve the valuation of real estate, partnership
interests, closely held corporations, loans receivable, copyrights
and patents, valuable art work, large blocks of securities, and
present and future interests in trusts. These disputes often reach
the courts. A start-up date would bring another set of subjective
valuations into the transfer tax picture, and the AICPA believes
that the accompanying distortions and inaccuracies would be an
unfortunate consequence of this approach. Moreover, the devel
opment of self-serving records to support valuations for the types
of assets listed above could become a widespread practice. The
prospects of an informed and fair review of the accuracy of these
records would likely be inversely proportional to the interval be
tween their preparation and review.
If a start-up date is adopted, enormous numbers of persons
will be obliged to price an inconceivably large number of assets.
Relatively few estates now must file federal estate tax returns be
cause of the exemption under current law. Consequently, the as
sets of relatively few estates undergo professional appraisal. But
it is difficult—if not impossible—for a taxpayer to know that he
will not have a taxable estate in the uncertain future. He, there
fore, cannot safely assume that he need not determine his start
up date values. Under these conditions, the appraisal of property
as of the start-up date would be an immediate major burden, and
valuation controversies in the settlement of estate tax liabilities
would be many times more frequent than is presently the case.
M arital and C haritable D eductions. The AET makes no al
lowance for transfers that qualify for the marital and charitable
deductions. In connection with the 100 percent marital deduction
proposal, the 1969 Treasury Proposals appropriately state:
It does not appear, then, that transfer of property between hus
band and wife are appropriate occasions for imposing tax. An
especially difficult burden may be imposed by the tax when
property passes to a widow, particularly if there are minor chil
dren. The present system of taxing transfers between spouses
does not accord with common understanding of most husbands
and wives that the property they have accum ulated is ‘ours.’ (p.

358)
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This view should be compared with the ABA’s view that “as
a matter of theory, imposition of a tax on appreciation should not
turn upon the destination or use of the appreciation.” As a matter
of practice and public policy, the marital deduction has been al
lowed in valid recognition of the nature of the marital relation
ship and to equate the tax consequences of taxpayers living in
jurisdictions having diff erent property law concepts. Moreover,
deductions for income tax purposes generally have been allowed
for the value of assets transferred to charity, and no gain need
be reported if the transferred assets have appreciated.
The a b a ’s overriding consideration in suggesting these tax
provisions is revealed in the following statement.
Further, if exemptions from the A E T based upon the recipients
of the property subjected to the tax or adjustments to it are in
troduced, simplicity is lost, and administration becomes complex.

It is time that simplicity and ease of administration, whether it
works ‘for or ‘against’ the taxpayer, be considered as priority ob
jectives in the enactment of tax laws. ( pp. 2-43, 44, emphasis sup
plied )

If we substitute for the words “for” and “against" in the fore
going quotation the words “equitably” and “inequitably”—or
“fairly” and “unfairly”—the consequence of the selection of sim
plicity as the overriding priority may be more clearly apparent.
Simplicity and Unfairness—T he Correlatives. Although the
AET conceivably could be modified to achieve greater equity, the
ABA apparently prefers not to do this on the grounds of an over
riding need for simplicity. The following observations seem ap
propriate in this connection.
• Appreciation would be taxed, but there would be no tax rebate
for a net loss at death. The investor may have paid capital gains
taxes throughout his life, but no carryback of a net loss position
would be available, and no transfer tax reduction is suggested.
The ABA suggests that the investor would have some relief with
its proposed lower tax rate schedule. The AICPA believes that in
an effort to simplify this proposal, the fundamental income tax
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character of the AET is ignored, and thus the normal income tax
equitable safeguards are omitted.
• The AET is at a flat rate. A graduated rate, providing lower
rates for insubstantial amounts of appreciation, is rejected—in the
interest of simplicity.
• Properties qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions
are subjected to the A ET—in the interest of simplicity.
• The AET proposal incorporates a mandatory start-up date basis
rule, although the ABA recognizes that inequities would occur
between and among individuals, that there would be advantages
for taxpayers holding highly appreciated property at the enact
ment date, and that there would be hardship for taxpayers who
have a provable basis for property greater than its value on that
date—in the interest of simplicity.
• Tangible personal property generally is exempted from the
AET; neither gain nor loss would be considered; and no dollar
ceiling would be imposed upon the exemption, even though in
equities could result—in the interest of simplicity.
Constitutionality. The ABA states that the capital gain tax
on net unrealized appreciation at death has been attacked as
unconstitutional. It further asserts: “Any problem in this regard is
avoided by the AET, which is an excise tax as contrasted to an
income tax.” Regarding the nature of its proposed tax, the ABA
admits, “Some people will say that the AET is nothing more than
a capital gains tax at death. They are obviously correct in the
sense that the result is th e sam e—th e taxation of net unrealized
appreciation at death.” In view of the foregoing, a layman might
wonder why an AET at death should be considered any more or
less constitutional than a capital gain tax at death. Would not the
courts, in evaluating the constitutionality of the AET, look hard
at the acknowledged similarity of the result, and not be unduly
swayed by the label “excise tax”?

Summary
The proposals that would purportedly prevent any tax reduc
tion opportunities under the current system are melanges of com
plexities and inequities bound to cause extreme difficulties for
taxpayers and government alike. If there is merit to the positions
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of both the 1969 Treasury Proposals and the ABA that proof of
actual basis over the years would be a hardship, then carryover
of basis is impractical and, as a matter of equity, we should then
resort to a new start-up basis under any new taxing proposal. If,
however, there is—as the AICPA contends—a host of inherent in
equities in the new start-up basis, then it should be rejected. It
is believed also that the notion that the occasion of death is an
appropriate time for the recognition of unrealized gain is un
sound and that it should not be acceptable to Congress.
The asserted imperatives for a change of current law are not
absolutely compelling. It is at least debatable that a shift of
problems from one tax system (for example, the income tax sys
tem) to another (for example, the estate tax system) is progress.
Estates which pay as much tax as did our illustrative taxpayers
B-1 and B-2 on pages 23—27 do not escape the taxing system.
Furthermore, there should be no extensive opportunities for
transfer tax avoidance if the AICPA’s other recommendations—
a unified transfer tax; restrictions on generation skipping; and re
jection of an increased marital deduction—are adopted. The pres
ent rules do not confuse the separate roles of the income and es
tate taxes. The estate tax complements the income tax. The estate
tax is equitably progressive; at least, it has such high rates that
Congress should continue to permit the beneficiaries to take bases
equal to the full values subject to such heavy tax assessments.
The AICPA knows and experienced practitioners will attest
that the present system is workable. The ease of reference to
finally determined estate tax values to prove the bases of assets
subsequently sold is manifest. If simplicity of administration of
the tax law has merit, as is so often asserted by members of Con
gress and professional groups, the AICPA believes that where
the law has this attribute with respect to taxation at death, it
should not be discarded.
A practical and equitable exchange of a tax on appreciation
cannot be made for an appreciable rate reduction. A new start-up
date necessitates a phase-in of any rate reduction, as is apparent
in the AET proposal. The new start-up date also requires specula
tion as to the amount of tax which would be derived from ap
preciation over the years ahead as shown by the previous discus
sion of the ups and downs of the securities markets. Congress
would have to gamble that appreciation during that period would
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be enough to permit a considerably lower top tax bracket. More
over, whatever the rate concessions might be, these intended
benefits might be more than counterbalanced by the new pro
posed tax system to which estates would be subject. Reasonable
opportunities for rate reduction exist in the AICPA’s several
other recommendations.

38

5
Unified Transfer Tax
Background
Current law imposes an estate tax on certain transfers at death
and a gift tax on certain transfers during life. Each tax has a
separate rate schedule with the gift tax rates representing threequarters of the estate tax rates at comparable levels. The estate
tax exemption is $60,000 while the gift tax has a lifetime exemp
tion of $30,000 for each donor and an annual exclusion of $3,000
for gifts of present interests to each of any number of donees.
The gift tax is imposed on the value of the gift but the gift tax
itself is not treated as an additional transfer subject to tax. Under
the estate tax law, the tax itself is subjected to tax because the
estate tax is imposed on the gross estate reduced only by deduc
tions and not by the estate tax.
Statistics repeatedly issued by the Treasury indicate that de
spite the substantial tax incentives for lifetime giving, only a
small percentage of individuals for whom estate tax returns are
filed make such gifts in amounts exceeding the lifetime gift ex
emption and the annual gift tax exclusions.

Discussion
The primary policy question involved in determining whether
there should be a single rate structure applicable to lifetime
transfers and to transfers at death is the extent to which lifetime
giving should be encouraged. The general consensus appears to
be that such giving should be encouraged because it is socially
desirable to have property transferred to or for the benefit of
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younger generations where there is usually a greater need and a
greater willingness to make the property productive. Thus, the
issue becomes whether the present dual rate structure strikes a
proper balance between creating incentives for lifetime giving
and being fair to different taxpayers.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals take the position that current
law grants an undue preference to lifetime gifts because it bene
fits the relatively wealthy individual who can afford to make sig
nificant lifetime gifts compared to the less well-to-do individual
who cannot afford to do so.
Position of Other Professional Groups

The ABA favors a single rate structure for all transfers, wheth
er made during life or at death. The ABA’s acceptance of a sin
gle rate structure is subject to the qualification that the rates will
be lowered to offset the additional transfer taxes that will be pay
able at death by persons who make taxable transfers during life.
“Grossing up” the amount of lifetime gifts to be included in a
single rate structure for all transfers has also been proposed. This
concept has been explained to require that the single-rate-sched
ule transfer tax would be imposed upon the fair market value of
the property transferred, including, in the case of lifetime trans
fers, the amount of the federal transfer tax incurred on the trans
fer, which is an integral part of the making of the gift. Under
present law, the tax on lifetime gifts is based on the fair market
value of the property transferred exclusive of any gift tax. In the
case of testamentary transfers, however, the present estate tax is
imposed on the full value of the property in the estate, including
that portion used to pay the estate tax imposed. Under the uni
fied transfer tax, this difference in treatment between lifetime
gifts and testamentary transfers would be eliminated by grossing
up the fair market value of lifetime gifts, thus causing the trans
fer tax in effect, to be paid out of the property taxed, as is the
case with testamentary transfers. A table would be provided
showing the amount of the grossed-up transfer so that taxpayers
would not be burdened with complex calculations.
The ABA opposes the use of grossing up for all lifetime
transfers on two grounds. First, it discourages lifetime gifts be
cause the payment of the additional transfer tax imposed on the
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tax results in the loss of subsequent earnings on that amount
during the remaining life of the transferor. Second, it is compli
cated and would not be understood by transferors, particularly
when, as is possible, the tax is greater than the amount of the
gift itself.
A majority of the members comprising various bodies within
the ALI appear to prefer a unified transfer tax. In October 1967,
however, the Council of the ALI voted 12 to 11 in favor of the
retention of the dual tax system.
At the present time, there appears to be no official ALI recom
mendation on the choice between a dual tax system and a uni
fied tax system. The ALI does appear to favor grossing up all
lifetime transfers and the retention of the present $3,000 annual
gift tax exclusions.
AICPA Proposals

Since lifetime transfers should continue to be encouraged and
further, since the current incidence of taxation on testamentary
dispositions is imposed disproportionately and unfairly on low
and medium-sized estates, the AICPA proposes a modified uni
fied transfer tax as follows.
R etention o f Current E state Tax Rates. The modified unified
transfer tax would utilize the federal estate tax rates as currently
established by IRC Sec. 2001. Along with this, the AICPA ad
vocates continuation of the current incentive to make inter vivos
gifts by subjecting such gifts to a tax at the rate of 75 percent
of that rate.
Inclusion o f L ifetim e Gifts. Lifetime gifts would be included
in the unified rate without grossing up lifetime dispositions ex
cept for gifts in contemplation of death. The 75 percent rate
would be preserved at death by the inclusion of only 75 percent
of the taxable value of property transferred during lifetime and
by the granting of credit against the unified transfer tax liability
for gift taxes paid on such taxable gifts. Gifts in contemplation
of death, as that term is currently defined by Sec. 2035, would be
grossed up so that both the value of the property at the date
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of death and the amount of gift tax paid would be subject to the
unified transfer tax at death. Credit would be granted against the
unified transfer tax liability for gift taxes paid on gifts made in
contemplation of death.
Annual Exclusion fo r Gifts. The AICPA advocates the con
tinuation of the $3,000 annual exclusion for gifts of present in
terests in property as currently provided by Sec. 2 5 0 3 (b ).
Unified Transfer Tax D eduction. For the current estate tax ex
emption in the amount of $60,000, provided by Sec. 2052, and
the current specific gift tax exemption in the amount of $30,000,
provided by Sec. 2521, the AICPA would substitute a unified
transfer tax deduction in the amount of $150,000, available, at
the option of the taxpayer, either against inter vivos gift tax
liabilities or against the unified transfer tax imposed at death.
R etention o f M arital D eduction. The AICPA proposes the re
tention of the allowance of a marital deduction as currently pro
vided by Sec. 2056.

Summary
The AICPA believes that the recommendations outlined above
will continue to encourage lifetime gifts. The continuation of the
75 percent gift tax rates, the availability of annual gift tax exclu
sions, the continuing possibility of removing asset appreciation
from an estate by eliminating from the death transfer tax appre
ciation from the date of the gift to the date of death, and the
income tax considerations often associated with inter vivos trans
fers can all be cited as continuing reasons to support inter vivos
gift transfers.
The current estate exemption of $60,000 and the current spe
cific gift tax exemption of $30,000 are inadequate when con
sidered in light of many years’ inflation. Accordingly, the AICPA
recommends that the current tax exemptions be replaced by a uni
fied transfer tax deduction of $150,000, available to a taxpayer to
reduce either the amounts of inter vivos taxable gifts or to reduce
the taxable estate. Also recommended is the continuation of the
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two present transfer tax schedules since the availability of two
schedules does not create undue administrative problems.
The “gross-up” concept for inter vivos transfers is opposed pri
marily because such a provision would discourage lifetime gifts.
The gross-up concept also appears to be extremely complex in
administration.
Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 (p. 44-47) respectively illustrate the
AICPA recommendations to retain the current rates, to retain
the current concept of a marital deduction, and to substitute
a unified transfer tax deduction in the amount of $150,000 for
the current $60,000 and $30,000 estate and gift tax exemp
tions. (Each schedule illustrates four hypothetical estate valua
tions.) The AICPA believes that these recommendations, when
combined with its other recommendations, including our recom
mendation for severe restrictions on generation skipping, will not
adversely affect the total federal revenues derived from these
sources. Instead, these recommendations should alleviate sub
stantial inequities currently imposed on low and medium-sized
estates. It is noteworthy in the following schedules that total
transfer taxes from an estate with net disposable assets aggre
gating $200,000 would be decreased from $36,100 to $7,000,
while for larger estates, total transfer taxes would not be sig
nificantly affected. Equally important should be the fact that in
the typical situation where the male predeceases the female, no
death transfer taxes would be payable at the death of the first
decedent until net disposable assets exceed $300,000 where the
surviving spouse inherits all of the family’s assets. Since the
necessities of life often dictate that in low and medium-sized
estates the surviving spouse requires all of the family’s assets,
the AICPA proposed tax structure should permit and strongly
encourage such testamentary dispositions by imposing the major
portion of death transfer tax liability only at the time of death
of the second spouse.
Exhibit 7 (p. 46—47) illustrates the effect of inter vivos gifts
(other than gifts in contemplation of death) by the first decedent.
Note that substantial savings in total federal unified transfer
taxes can be realized by the continued use of inter vivos gifts;
such savings are increased where the unified transfer tax deduc
tion of $150,000 is not claimed against earlier gifts taxed at low
gift tax rates.
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44
$ 31,300

Federal estate tax

Tax as % of total net disposal assets

Total federal estate taxes

18.1%

$ 36,100

$135,200

Taxable estate

Summary

$195,200
60,000

Net disposable assets
Less exemption

Second D eath

$

Federal estate tax

4,800

$ 40,000
126,500

440,000

$

$

25.3%

253,000

126,500

$ 440,000

$ 500,000
60,000

$

$

560,000

500,000
60,000

100,000
60,000
160,000

$1,000,000

$200,000

Taxable estate

Total reductions

Net disposable assets (after reduction
by liabilities and expenses)
Less:
Marital deduction
Exemption

First D eath

Current Federal Estate Taxes—No Inter Vivos Gifts

38.8%

$1,937,600

$ 968,800

$2,440,000

$2,500,000
60,000

$ 968,800

$2,440,000

2,560,000

2,500,000
60,000

$5,000,000

48.6%

$ 4,860,800

$ 2,430,400

$ 4,940,000

$ 5,000,000
60,000

$ 2,430,400

$ 4,940,000

5,060,000

5,000,000
60,000

$10,000,000

EXHIBIT 5
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Tax as % of total net disposal assets

Total federal estate taxes

$

$

Federal estate tax

Summary

$ 50,000

Taxable estate

3.5%

7,000

7,000

$200,000
150,000

None

N o ne
97,700

$

$

19.5%

195,400

97,700

$ 350,000

$ 500,000
150,000

$

350,000

650,000

500,000
150,000

100,000
150,000
250,000

$1,000,000

$200,000

Net disposable assets
Less unified transfer tax deduction

Second D eath

Federal estate tax

Taxable estate

Total reductions

Net disposable assets (after reduction
by liabilities and expenses)
Less:
Marital deduction
Unified transfer tax deduction

First D eath

37.0%

$1,849,400

$ 924,700

$2,350,000

$2,500,000
150,000

$ 924,700

$ 2 ,350,000

2,650,000

2,500,000
150,000

$5,000,000

Proposed Federal Unified Transfer Tax—No Inter Vivos Gifts

47.5%

$ 4,747,400

$ 2,373,700

$ 4, 850,000

$ 5,000,000
150,000

$ 2,373,700

$ 4,850,000

5, 150,000

5,000,000
150,000

$10,000,000

EXHIBIT 6
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Asset balance

Net disposable assets (reduced by
amounts of gifts and gift taxes)
Plus:
75% of inter vivos gifts

First D eath

200,000

None

$200,000

None

Taxable gifts

Federal gift tax

None

None

$200,000

Less unified transfer tax deduction

Inter vivos gifts by first decedent of 20%
of net disposable assets (not in con
templation of death) —except in case
of $200,000 estate

Net disposable assets

$

912,000

150,000

762,000

38,000

200,000

200,000
(None
claimed)

$

$

$

$1,000,000

4,505,700

750,000

$3,755,700

$ 244,300

$1,000,000

$1,000,000
(None
claimed)

$5,000,000

Proposed Federal Unified Transfer Tax—With Inter Vivos Gifts

564,900

8,935,100

1,500,000

$ 7,435,100

$

$ 2,000,000

$ 2,000,000
(None
claimed)

$10,000,000

EXHIBIT 7
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None
None
None

Federal estate tax
Less credit for gift tax paid

Net federal estate tax

Tax as %of total net disposable assets

Total federal unified transfer taxes

$

$

Federal estate tax

Summary

$ 50,000

Taxable estate

3.5%

7,000

7,000

$200,000
150,000

Net disposable assets
Less unified transfer tax deduction

Second D eath

None

45,600

83,600
38,000

83,600

16.7%

$ 167,200

$

$ 306,000

$ 456,000
150,000

$

$

$ 306,000

606,000

150,000

150,000
250,000

456,000

100,000

Taxable estate

Total deductions

Less:
50% marital deduction
Unified transfer tax deduction not
previously claimed

32.1%

$1,607,200

$ 803,600

$2,1027850

$2,252,850
150,000

$ 559,300

$ 803,600
244,300

$2,102,850

2,402,850

150,000

2,252,850

40.8%

$ 4,076,600

$ 2,038,300

$ 4,3 17,550

$ 4,467,550
150,000

$ 1,473,400

$ 2,038,300
564,900

$ 4,317,550

4,617,550

150,000

4,467,550

48
7,000

Total proposed federal unified transfer
taxes (no inter vivos gifts) —Exhibit 6

(Not ap
plicable)

Total tax as %of total net disposable assets

16.7%

167,200

$

(Not ap
plicable )

Total proposed federal unified transfer
taxes after inter vivos gifts of 20% of net
disposable assets—Exhibit 7

195,400

25.3%

253,000

19.5%

$

$

$1,000,000

Total tax as %of net disposable assets

$

18.1%

$ 36,100

Total current federal estate taxes (no in
ter vivos gifts) —Exhibit 5

Total tax as %of net disposable assets

$ 200,000

Net disposable assets (after reduction by
liabilities and expenses)

Summary

32.1%

$1,607,200

37.0%

$1,849,400

38.8%

$1,937,600

$5,000,000

40.8%

$ 4,076,600

47.5%

$ 4,747,400

48.6%

$ 4,860,800

$10,000,000

EXHIBIT 8

Exhibit 8 (opposite) summarizes the computations in Exhibits
5, 6, and 7.
Assume the following for these schedules:
1. Decedents with net disposal assets of $200,000 or less transfer
their total estate to a surviving spouse. Such second estates are
reduced only by federal estate taxes imposed at the first death.
2. Decedents with net disposable assets of $1,000,000 or more
utilize a full marital deduction and limit testamentary disposi
tions to a spouse to such amount.
3. Assets transferred at the death of the first decedent neither
appreciate nor depreciate in value between the date of transfer
and the date of death of the second spouse.
4. Credit for state death taxes are disregarded for the purposes
of these computations since they effectively represent a substitu
tion for such death taxes.
5. Annual exclusions are disregarded in determining inter vivos
gifts in Exhibit 7.
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6
Liberalization of Deferred Payment of
Federal Estate Tax
Background
Section 6166 was enacted by Congress in 1958, The House com
mittee report accompanying HR 8381, which added Sec. 6166 to
the 1954 code, provided that where the value of an interest in a
closely held business represents a significant portion of the base
on which the federal estate tax is computed, the federal death
tax can be paid in ten annual installments instead of a lump-sum
payment fifteen months after the death of the decedent.
For purposes of IRC Sec. 6166 a closely held business includes
a proprietorship, or stock or ownership interest in a partnership
or corporation of 20 percent or more, or a partnership or corpora
tion in which there are ten or fewer partners or shareholders.
The House committee report explained the purpose was to
make it possible to keep together a business enterprise where the
death of one of the larger owners of the business results in the
imposition of a relatively heavy estate tax. Under existing law,
when a decedent has a substantial portion of his estate invested
in the business enterprise, the heirs might be confronted with the
necessity of either breaking up the business or selling it to a larger
enterprise in order to obtain funds to pay the federal estate tax.
This is especially unfortunate in the case of small businesses,
which traditionally are also closely held businesses. By spreading
out the period over which the estate tax may be paid, it would be

51

possible for the estate tax to be paid out of the earnings of the
business, or at least it would provide the heirs with time to obtain
funds with which to pay the tax without upsetting the operation
of the business. This provision was believed to be particularly
important in preventing corporate mergers and in maintaining
the free enterprise system.
Section 6166 was deemed necessary because the general provi
sion of Sec. 6161(a) (1 ) permitting a six-month extension of time
for payment of federal taxes, including federal estate taxes by
the IRS for reasonable cause, is not an adequate remedy for an
executor holding an interest in a closely held business. Section
6161(a) (2), which permits the IRS to grant an extension of time
for up to ten years for payment of estate taxes upon a showing
that payment of the entire estate tax would result in “undue
hardship” to the estate, is also an inadequate relief procedure for
an executor holding an interest in a closely held business. For de
cedents dying after December 31, 1970, an extension of time un
der Sec. 6 1 6 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) can be granted for up to a year (for rea
sonable cause). Section 6165 permits the IRS to require that a
bond (for up to twice the amount of tax involved) be furnished
where an extension of time for payment is granted. The regula
tions permit the IRS to require such a bond when an extension is
granted under Sec. 6161. The bond requirement has not been ap
plied in connection with Sec. 6166 extensions.
Where applicable, Sec. 303 presently permits redemption of
stock of closely held corporations, to the extent of the entire
amount of estate taxes, administration expenses, and funeral ex
penses. If there is a profit on the redemption ( that is, if the sales
price exceeds the estate tax value), the profit is taxed as a capital
gain.

Discussion
Reference to the amount of the estate taxes, federal and state,
payable at death, indicates that the executor of the estate of a
deceased owner of a closely held business interest is faced with
a substantial liability for estate taxes. The growth of the value
of such an interest during the lifetime of the owner, increases
the potential estate tax burden. The greater the growth, the
greater the likelihood that the executors will have to sell the
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closely held business interest. Inflation serves further to aggra
vate this problem.
The following chart indicates the estate tax liability of a de
cedent resident of New York State.
Estate
before
exemption

$ 300,000
500,000
700,000
1,060,000
2,060,000
3,060,000
4,060,000
5,060,000
6,060,000

Federal
tax

$

59,100
116,500
176,700
289,140
649,280
1,075,920
1,551,560
2,069,880
2,620,200

New York
tax

$ 10,000
20,000
32,000
58,800
153,000
267,200
401,400
551,000
710,600

Total

$

69,100
136,500
208,700
347,940
802,280
1,343,120
1,952,960
2,620,880
3,330,800

Percent on excess
New
Federal
York

26.8
28.0
30.2
33.4
41.8
47.2
52.6
55.8
58.0

5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
15.0
16.0

The owner of a substantial equity in a closely held business
needs statutory help, which would permit deferred payment of
these substantial tax liabilities. The very size of the tax in rela
tion to the estate should be enough “hardship” to permit relief
without the necessity of proving “undue hardship” as presently
required by See. 6161 ( a ) ( 2 ) .
The approach of Sec. 6166 in permitting an absolute right
for installment payments over a ten-year period of federal estate
tax attributable to taxation of a closely held business interest
should be extended to provide relief in more instances.
Where there are several closely held business equities in an
estate, the yardsticks of Sec. 303 and Sec. 6166 to treat them as
one interest should be alike.
Position of Other Professional Groups

Section V III of the 1969 Treasury Proposals, “Estate and Gift
Tax Proposals,” contained recommendations for liberalization of
the Sec. 6166 payment rules. The proposals indicate that the
“voting stock” requirement should be eliminated and that the
shareholder limit should be raised from ten to fifteen. Further
proposed liberalization would include permitting the installmentpayment election (Sec. 6166) where the interest in the closely
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held business exceeds 25 percent of the taxable estate. The Trea
sury Proposals would then limit the application of Sec. 303 to
the portion of the estate tax which could qualify under Sec. 6166.
The ABA, in its “Summary of Transfer Act Draft Statute of the
American Bankers Association” would permit deferral under Sec.
6166 where the decedent’s interest in a closely held business ex
ceeds 20 percent of his transfers at death. The definition of close
ly held stock would include any stock not traded on a national
securities exchange or in an over-the-counter market, or if so
traded, if the estate includes 20 percent or more of the voting
stock. In the case of partnerships, the required percentage of
partnership interest would be reduced from twenty to ten, and
the limitation on partners would be increased from ten to twenty.

AICPA Proposals
Section SOS Rules Regarding Treatm ent o f Several C losely H eld
Business E quities as O ne Should T ake on the Standards o f Sec.
6166. Section 303 presently permits two or more corporations to
be treated as a single corporation where an estate owns more than
75 percent in value of the outstanding stock in each of the cor
porations. Section 6166 has a similar provision, except that the
ownership requirement is more than 50 percent of the stock. The
AICPA recommends that this percentage test be the same for
purposes of Secs. 303 and 6166, and that the 50 percent or more
test of Sec. 6166 apply for purposes of Secs. 303 and 6166.
P eriod fo r Sec. SOS R edem ption Should R ecogn ize Litigation in
Any Court. The period during which Sec. 303 may be utilized is
the period of limitations for assessment of federal estate tax plus
ninety days, or, if a petition for redetermination of an estate tax
deficiency has been filed with the Tax Court, at any time before
the expiration of sixty days after the decision of the Tax Court be
comes final. The AICPA feels that there is no reason that taxpay
ers who litigate in the District Court or Court of Claims should
be prejudiced, and the AICPA recommends that the period dur
ing which Sec. 303 may be applied be extended to the expiration
of ninety days after the conclusion of litigation with regard to
the estate tax liability.
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Elim ination o f Voting Stock R equirem ent o f Sec. 6166 an d the
Raising o f the S hareholder Lim it. These AICPA proposals are
in agreement with those set forth by the Treasury Department.
R eductions in Percentage O wnership o f Stock R equirem ents in
Secs. 303 and 6166. This is in agreement with the ABA’s pro
posal. The AICPA favors these reductions in percentage owner
ship of stock requirements to 20 percent (of transfers at death).
It is also felt that Sec. 6166 should be as available to partners as it
is to stockholders.
The purpose of Sec. 6166 is to provide additional time to pay
estate taxes where the deceased's assets are not readily con
vertible to cash because such assets consist of an interest in a
closely held business. In these instances, an estate which includes
a minority interest in a business may be less able to cause a re
demption by the business of that interest than a holder of a large
interest. Therefore, some holders are in great need of the benefit
of Sec. 6166.
The problem with respect to liquidity of partnership interest
is similar to that of the liquidity of a stockholder interest and
should be subject to the same rules.
R etention o f Sec. 303(a). In opposition to the 1969 Treasury
Proposals, the AICPA does not feel that Sec. 303 should be re
stricted to the estate taxes attributable to the inclusion of a close
ly held business in the gross estate. Section 303 is presently broad
er in that it permits redemption of amounts representing all estate
taxes as well as administrative expenses. The narrowing of Sec.
303 would impose a serious liquidity hardship on estates which
have to incur a substantial income tax liability in order to pay
the estate taxes.
Elim inate “U ndue” R equirem ent o f H ardship Situations. Sec
tion 6 1 6 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) should be revised to eliminate the word “undue”
from the phrase “undue hardship.” The use of the word “undue”
has in effect nullified the value of the provision because of the
administrative problems of determining what hardship is “undue”
hardship.
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Section 6166 Should Apply to Partners in a M anner Similar to
Stockholders. Section 6166 relief should be as available to part
ners as to stockholders.
Elim inate Sec. 303's Extension Restriction to Tax Court Cases.
A Sec. 303 redemption should be permitted after the conclusion
of litigation in any court.

Summary
The AICPA believes that the tax laws should be made as con
sistent as possible in similar provisions of related sections and in
addition that they should not contain provisions which are ad
ministratively impractical.
Differences among similar provisions, such as Secs. 6166 and
303, presently cause confusion and inequities among taxpayers,
and we feel our recommendations would result in greater fairness.
We believe that the recommendations contained in this section
will bring about better results administratively and will be more
acceptable to taxpayers in various situations.

Conclusion
The AICPA believes that the recommendations in this report
provide a sound basis for federal estate and gift tax reform as far
as the five areas reviewed are concerned. The AICPA feels that
it has conformed the principles of fairness and simplicity to the
extent that these two principles can be combined in this connec
tion.
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